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Why are Banks Highly Interconnected?

Presented by: 
A Lehar University of Calgary
Date: 
Tuesday 26th August 2014 - 09:00 to 09:30
Venue: 
INI Seminar Room 1
Abstract: 

Joint with A. David

 

We study optimal interconnections between banks in alternative banking systems created using interbank loans and over-the-counter derivatives. Settlements on all interbank payments are renegotiated in the event of financial distress of a counterparty. A high degree of interconnectectness plays a positive role as it commits counterparties to renegotiate claims to reduce dead weight liquidation costs in the system. We show that the renegotiable interbank loans form the optimal interconnection to the joint risk management and asset quality problem faced by the banks. In addition, our analysis shows that systemic spillovers and the likelihood of financial crises are severely mismeasured when interbank renegotiations are not considered. The optimality of interbank loans is shown to hold in a wide range of institutional settings.

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Presentation Material: 
University of Cambridge Research Councils UK
    Clay Mathematics Institute The Leverhulme Trust London Mathematical Society Microsoft Research NM Rothschild and Sons