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Competition among Renewables

Presented by: 
Natalia Fabra Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Date: 
Monday 18th March 2019 - 11:15 to 12:00
Venue: 
INI Seminar Room 1
Abstract: 

 

We model strategic behavior of renewable suppliers when competing in electricity auctions. We introduce renewables' intermittency by assuming that firms' available capacities are random and private information. In equilibrium, bid functions are a smooth decreasing function of firms' realized capacities. Thus, at times when there is more renewables' availability, supply functions shift outwards and downwards, leading to reductions in the market price. An increase in correlation between firms' available capacities strengthens competition non-monotonically. Keywords: electricity, competition, auctions.

Natalia Fabra and Gerard Llobet (CEMFi) 

 

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Presentation Material: 
University of Cambridge Research Councils UK
    Clay Mathematics Institute London Mathematical Society NM Rothschild and Sons